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1. Introduction 
Energy efficiency is often seen as perhaps the most straightforward ‘no-regrets’ means of delivering 
energy security, greenhouse gas emissions reductions and decoupling economic growth from rising 
energy use (Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, 2004). Moreover, energy efficiency can act as a bulwark against 
ever-increasing pressure on energy-intensive industries to reduce emissions and energy use in a 
carbon-constrained world. Rising fuel prices and their impact on industrial competitiveness have 
made energy efficiency improvements a central focus of EU energy policy. The oil crises of 1973–
1974 and 1979 brought energy prices (and hence energy efficiency) to the fore as a crucial concern 
in national policy-making.  More recently, external pressures such as the US shale gas ‘revolution’ 
and China’s burgeoning steel exports have highlighted the challenges Europe faces in terms of global 
competitiveness if it is to retain its domestic manufacturing base.  In response to a mandate from the 
European Council, the European Commission released a report on energy-intensive industries (like 
steel, ceramic, chemicals, glass), which documents how the competitiveness of these industries may 
be at risk as a result of increasing energy costs associated with energy prices and transmission costs 
(CEPS, 2014). 
 
Faced with the slow recovery of the industrial output against the challenge of growing competitive 
pressures from emerging economies following the global financial crises, most countries in the EU 
continue to witness a falling share of their manufacturing sectors (Bernard et al, 2016; Stollinger, 
2016).  Given that the manufacturing sector is viewed as a key element in national industrial strategy 
and employment in traditional industries, many European politicians have sought to avert (or at least 
attenuate) the decline in manufacturing associated with the wider structural shift towards service 
sectors (Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006; OECD, 2016). These efforts have hinged on the presumption 
that a strong industrial base is fundamental to Europe’s economic recovery and competitiveness.  
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To remain profitable in such a globally competitive environment in the face of stringent 
environmental policies and regulation, firms must constantly increase their productivity performance. 
Becoming more innovative in term of production and process is one promising way to open new paths 
in this context. Since the launch of the EU ETS in 2005, there has been considerable debate over 
carbon leakage, i.e., the extent to which firms would move operations of higher-carbon activities 
abroad versus inducing European manufacturing firms to develop new emission reducing 
technological innovation and thereby maintain output levels (e.g, Sato et al, 2015; Demailly and 
Quirion, 2006). 
 
Research into energy intensity, defined as the ratio of energy use to gross value added, has tended to 
focus on the contributions of energy efficiency improvements towards reducing global energy 
consumption and greenhouse emissions. Evidence of technological efficiency effect in decreasing 
aggregate energy intensity is documented in a number of studies, including Welsch and Ochsen 
(2005), Metcalf (2008), Zhang (2013), Voigt et al. (2014), Parker and Liddle (2016), and Karimu et 
al. (2017). Moreover, several previous studies also allude to the fact that structural effects can have 
an impact on the energy intensity change (see Unander, 2007; Lescaroux, 2008; Huntingdon, 2010; 
Mulder and de Groot, 2012; Mulder et al., 2014).  This has necessitated using other perspectives 
beyond the traditional approach of technological and structural effects to further investigate the 
factors influencing energy efficiency. Investigating the factors contributing to declining energy 
intensity is usually based on regression analysis following decomposition of the total energy intensity 
into efficiency and structural effects. 
However, while the technological efficiency effect and the structural effect separately affect 
aggregate energy intensity change, the existing literature reveals an obvious neglect of the direct role 
of technological innovation on energy intensity2. Furthermore, even though technological efficiency 
                                                          
2 Perhaps, this could be explained by lack of sector-level data on innovation activities such as patent in the manufacturing 
industry which has made its inclusion difficult in previous empirical studies (Anadon et al., 2011; Gallagher et al., 2012). 
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change is adjudged to be an important driver of the change in energy intensity, the index number 
approach does not account for the contribution coming from this source (Ma et al; 2009). To the 
extent that decomposition analyses provide important insights regarding the overall intensity of 
energy consumption, as well as the structure of the economy, sectoral energy intensity is directly 
linked with production, which tends to be impacted more specifically by policy actions. 
We measure energy intensity by the ratio of energy use input to gross value added. Sectors also differ 
in terms of energy required relative to other inputs like capital and labour (Mulder and Groot, 2012). 
Therefore, gaining a comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing energy intensity (i.e., 
energy consumption per unit of output) at the sectoral level is crucial. Indeed, this analysis is all the 
more important considering the high degree of variation in energy intensity across industries, ranging 
from 40.70 TJ/ $million PPP (in 1995$) in the chemical industry to 1.87 TJ/ $million PPP (in 1995$) 
in the electrical and optical equipment industry 3 . For example, evidence of varying impact of 
technological innovation on energy intensity in different industries could indicate that certain 
industries possess greater or lesser ability to undertake more ambitious decarbonisation efforts and 
might require tailored intervention. This could provide useful information for policymakers on the 
design and implementation of fiscal incentives for enhancing further energy conservation and 
targeting new emission-reducing technologies.  
We offer four main contributions in this study. First, we have developed a unique sector-level patent 
dataset to investigate the determinants of industrial energy intensity across European manufacturing 
industries. As such, patent stock provides insight into the interplay of energy prices and technological 
innovation on energy intensity. Second, building on the existing energy demand literature, we 
consider asymmetric response of industrial energy intensity to price by decomposing energy price 
into three components.. Third, we explore heterogeneities across industry categories, with special 
                                                          
3 Average energy intensity is calculated by averaging the energy intensity across industry from 1995- 2009. See 
Appendix Figure 2 for the industrial energy intensity bar chart. 
5 
 
focus on energy-intensive industries and less energy-intensive industries.  Further, subsectors of 
manufacturing differ in important respects from each other in term of intensity of energy use, hence 
their reasonable classification as energy-intensive and less energy-intensive industries. Finally, we 
compare regional industrial energy intensity analysis by accounting for inter-regional differences, 
notably the presence or absence of a carbon tax. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief literature 
review of previous studies that examine the determinants of energy intensity. We describe our 
methodological approach in greater detail in Section 3. The data used are presented and discussed in 
Section 4. In Section 5 we present the results, while Section 6 offers some the conclusions and points 
to some important implications. 
 
2. Literature review 
Our study draws on two different strands of the academic literature that have each been well studied 
in their own right, but which have not intersected much – aggregate energy intensity found in single 
or multi-country version and asymmetric price response, usually employed in energy demand 
research. There is now a large body of work on energy intensity and its determinants, usually using a 
two-stage approach comprising index decomposition analysis technique and econometric techniques, 
on the relationship between energy intensity indices and their determinants4. These studies span a 
wide range of countries and time periods over the last three decades, including both multiple and 
single-country efforts. The change in energy intensity at the aggregate is found to occur through two 
basic sources. The change in sectoral energy productivity due to technological improvements, and 
                                                          
4 The two commonly used methods are the Fisher Ideal index, and the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI). See 
Ang and Zhang, 2000 for a detailed literature survey on index number decomposition analysis. 
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structural change which involves shifting production between sub-sectors, especially from energy-
intensive manufacturing industries towards less energy-intensive service sectors.5  
 
Many of the multi-country studies on economy-wide aggregate change in energy intensity analysis, 
including Oseni (2009), Zhang (2013), Jimenez and Mercado (2014), Mulder et al. (2014) and Atalla 
and Bean (2017), identify energy prices and per capita income as the main determinants of energy 
intensity. Examining energy determinants for 16 OECD countries, Oseni (2009) concludes that long-
run reduction in energy intensity as a result of energy prices and income is largely due to movement 
away from energy-intensives activities and toward the less energy-intensive service sector. Drawing 
on 75 countries, Jimenez and Mercado (2014) show that per capita income, petroleum prices, fuel-
energy mix, and GDP growth are the factors contributing to energy intensity with clear correlation 
with structural economic shift.  They conclude that Latin American countries experience decline in 
energy intensity around 20% during the sample period which was regarded as underperformance. 
Atalla and Bean (2017) estimated the determinants of energy productivity in 39 countries and confirm 
that findings of higher levels of income per capita and higher energy prices are associated with greater 
energy productivity while a greater share of output from industry is associated with lower energy 
productivity levels.  
 
Based on two-stage procedure, single country studies on economy-wide aggregate energy intensities 
include those of Metcalf (2008), Song and Zheng (2012) and Wu (2012) all of which find a marked 
reduction in energy intensity during the sample period and identified efficiency as the major driver 
responsible for decreasing energy intensity. Metcalf (2008) decomposed state-level energy intensity 
changes occurring in the United States and econometrically examined the decomposition indexes in 
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a panel analysis. In line with the earlier findings, Metcalf (2008) confirms that rising per capita 
income and energy prices significantly contribute to energy efficiency improvements but are not 
associated with structural economic shift.  Using a provincial-level panel data set, Song and Zheng 
(2012) adopt an econometric approach to examine the driving forces behind China’s changing energy 
intensity using a provincial-level panel data set for the period 1995 to 2009. They surmise that rising 
income plays a vital role in reducing energy intensity while increasing urbanization threatens energy 
intensity improvements. Wu (2012) further confirms that increasing income per capita and energy 
price led to a reduction in efficiency in China during over 1997–2007.  
 
Sectoral studies include Lescaroux (2008) on the US manufacturing sector using two-digit SIC level 
data and Mulder (2014) on the determinants of energy intensity in the Dutch service sector. The 
common factor in all these studies is that price played an important role in explaining the decline in 
energy intensity. Zhang (2013) also shows that income growth and energy price increases were the 
main drivers of energy efficiency, while the impact of trade is positively related to energy intensity 
in the manufacturing sector in Eastern Europe.  In contrast to the studies on the two-stage approach, 
Hang and Tu (2007), Fisher-Vanden et al. (2016) and Verbic et al., (2017) use only econometrics 
approach to investigate the determinants of energy intensity.  In particular, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2016) 
considered four Chinese energy-intensive industries in examining the factors influencing energy 
intensity and concluded that in all four industries, energy prices and technology6 are significant 
contributors to the decline in energy intensity.   
  
With respect to asymmetric price response, the energy demand literature has established that price 
changes may be asymmetric owing to the long life of capital and price-induced technical change 
(Gately and Huntington, 2002; Griffin and Schulman, 2005; Huntington, 2006; Adeyemi and Hunt 
                                                          
6 Fisher-Vanden et al. (2016) employ R&D expenditures as proxy for technological innovation. However, R&D is a 
measure of inputs, and takes no account of the productivity and effectiveness of effort (See Griffith et al., 2006). 
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2007, 2014; Olaniyan and Evans, 2014). It is therefore surprising that only a couple of papers, see 
Lescaroux (2008) and Parker and Liddle (2016), have attempted to examine this relationship between 
prices and efficiency. Lescaroux (2008) confirms the asymmetric response of energy intensity to 
prices, emphasizing that price rises is associated with more efficiency improvements than those lost 
when prices fall. However, Parker and Liddle (2016) find no statistically significant relationship 
between asymmetric price and energy intensity and conclude that the direction of price movement 
may not matter to energy intensity.  
 
In summary, there is a broad agreement that increasing energy prices is an effective contributing tool 
for reducing energy intensity. Unlike Parker and Liddle (2016) who consider only upward and 
downward price movement, we adopt the traditional price decomposition approach following 
Adeyemi and Hunt (2007, 2014) and disaggregate energy price into three phases: price maximum 
(maximum historical prices), price recovery (sub-maximum increases) and price cut. This enables us 
to disentangle the effect of changing oil prices during the low-price period of prior to 2004 and the 
period of marked oil price increases over 2004-2008, which culminated in the historical high reached 
in July 2008 just before the onset of the Global Economic Crisis 7 . The interactions between 
technological innovation and the price components can lead to varying direct price-induced 
innovation in the manufacturing sector owing to the argument that the energy demand response to an 
increase in the maximum price is not necessarily the same as the response to a price recovery. Hence, 
understanding these interactions allows policymaker to revise policies to achieve their objectives as 
a result of price changes. 
  
                                                          
7 Although energy price includes all forms of energy other than oil, the emphasis on oil prices is only an indication of 
high volatility experienced by oil prices relative to other energy prices during the financial crises. 
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3. Methodology and Hypotheses 
Our aim is to investigate the factors influencing energy intensity in the EU manufacturing sector.  
Many factors have been widely acknowledged to influence industrial energy intensity and the 
approach adopted here is similar to that of Fisher-Vanden et al (2016). We lay out below a set of 
relevant hypotheses to examine the impact of key economic factors in the EU manufacturing sector. 
These testable hypotheses are discussed under following general categories—energy prices; 
technological innovation; capital intensity; trade openness; regional differences; and exposure to 
carbon pricing.  
 
The arguments as to why these determinants of energy intensity such as an increase in energy prices 
may lead to lower energy intensity has been well studied since higher prices are expected to lead to 
lower energy consumption (see Parker and Liddle; 2016, Mulder and Groot; 2012, 2014).   
 
H1: We expect energy prices, ceteris paribus, to have a significant and negative relationship with 
energy intensity. In particular, we expect energy-intensive industries to respond more aggressively 
by lowering their energy intensity more than less energy-intensive industries in response to higher 
energy prices. 
 
Closely allied to increases in energy prices is the impact of technological innovation on energy 
intensity. In practice, technical innovation in manufacturing industries might not be realized without 
an effective driving force in which pricing plays an important role. The increase in cost of energy 
could lead to the development of more energy-efficient technologies (Birol and Keppler, 2000).   
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H2.1: New technological innovation potentially enhances higher output using the same level of inputs, 
thereby reducing energy intensity. We expect that technology improvements in specific processes and 
products, proxied by patent stock, will lead to a decline in energy intensity. Faced with the need to 
adopt low-carbon technologies, we also expect energy-intensive industries to generate, ceteris 
paribus, more patents, thereby leading to a greater impact in reducing energy than for less energy-
intensive industries. 
 
 H2.2: The interplay between energy prices and innovation will result in substantial energy intensity 
reduction as firms are expected to react to an increase in energy prices by scaling up their investments 
in technological innovation. This interplay is proxied by the interaction of price and patent stock.  
 
Capital accumulation of more energy-efficient capital stock due to new technology is also crucial to 
reducing energy intensity. Popp (2001) posits that firms made costly adjustments to capital, despite 
the fall in energy prices in the early1980s, because the new technology, which was developed in 
response to the energy crisis, was better than the previously existing technology. Earlier studies, such 
as Thompson and Taylor (1995) and Steinbuks, and Neuhoff (2014) confirm the degree of substitution 
between energy and capital. Specifically, Thompson and Taylor (1995) established that capital and 
energy are substitutes in both the short and long run based on the estimates of the Morishima elasticity 
of substitution. Metcalf (2008) further argued that energy and technology may be substitutes in 
production. Thus, regardless of energy prices, technology-induced investment can contribute to 
reducing energy intensity. 
  
 H3: As a plausible means by which energy-efficient technologies can influence energy intensity, we 
expect capital intensity, proxied as capital-labour ratio, to be negatively related to energy intensity.  
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As more capital is geared toward more advanced production technologies, especially in energy-
intensive industries, energy efficiency improves.  
 
Trade openness has been considered as a channel for foreign technological spillovers in reducing 
energy consumption (Liao et al., 2009). This dates back to the work of Coe and Helpman (1995) 
which establish that technology spills over across countries via trade flows. Trade could also subject 
firms to a higher level of competition and encourage the development of cost-cutting strategies, which 
will encourage energy savings (EBRD, 2010). Technological diffusion via trade openness can 
stimulate domestic innovation and engender competition in the local economy, which also has 
implications for reducing energy intensity.  
 
    H4: Trade openness is expected to play an important role in explaining differences in energy 
intensity in the EU manufacturing sector.  In more trade-exposed energy-intensive industries such as 
steel (basic metals), we expect a negative relationship with energy intensity in order for firms in the 
industries to remain competitive and maintain their market share in the international markets. 
 
All 17 countries analyzed are part of the European Union and, as such, are subject to the same 
institutional framework, policies and directives (such as those on energy efficiency and climate 
change targets).  We expect though that in addition to the expected national differences in how 
policies are implemented driven by national circumstance there may also be strong regional effects.  
There are clear groupings within the group of countries in terms of common history, level of 
development, industrial structure and policy approaches to energy and climate change.  Over the 
course of the period of our study, the regulation of greenhouse gases has increased dramatically at 
both the national and EU level. In the early 1990s, Finland, followed by Sweden and Denmark 
imposed relatively high carbon taxes that have continued to this day.  Following the Kyoto Protocol 
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in 1997, the EU instituted an EU-wide Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which applied to the power 
and some (but not all) of the manufacturing sector. The system began operations in 2005 with a trial 
period and a full-fledged system from 2008, near the end of our time horizon. 
 
H5.1:  We would expect there to be a clear negative relationship between the level of the carbon tax 
and energy intensity in those countries where a carbon tax has been employed.   
H5.2: We expect that those sectors covered by the ETS will exhibit different responses in terms of 
improvements in energy intensity than other sectors that are not covered.  In particular, we expect 
that energy-intensive sectors within the EU ETS (e.g., metals, pulp and paper) will have a lower price 
elasticity than those energy-intensive sectors not covered by the ETS (notably chemicals).    
 
3.1 Panel data analysis 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel consisting of cross-sections of subsectors with a relatively short 
time series (15 years from 1995-2009). Given that the cross-sections cut across different subsectors 
in seventeen EU countries, there is the possibility of a range of time invariant country-specific and 
sector-specific unobserved factors influencing the behaviour of each sector. Hence, we adopt 
techniques from panel data econometrics, which are best suited to handle this observational-specific 
heterogeneity that is fixed over time. A distinctive feature of panel data modelling is the treatment of 
unobserved heterogeneity by simply including time-invariant unobservable individual effects in the 
model. The two alternative approaches for obtaining unbiased estimated parameters in panel data are 
to use fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators, each of which treats unobserved 
heterogeneity differently in a model.  While the FE estimator deals with such heterogeneity explicitly 
in the estimation process by putting in a dummy for each individual; otherwise known as the Least 
Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator, the RE estimator implicitly recognises it, and assumes 
the individual effects are drawn from the same probability distribution thereby making them random, 
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and treated as though they were a part of the error term. The FE estimator is always consistent, but 
the RE estimator, where applicable, is more efficient and becomes more parsimonious as it has fewer 
parameters. In a fixed effects model, consistency does not require that the individual and error terms 
are uncorrelated. However, RE estimators do require that the individual effects (and hence the 
composite error term) are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables for it to be consistent. A 
specification test based on the comparison of two alternative estimators of the same parameter vector 
is known as the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), which is often used to choose the appropriate 
estimator.  
 
However, since the cross-sections in this dataset represent in twelve industries in seventeen EU 
countries with distinctive sovereign power, these variations could amount to unobserved 
heterogeneity. If this unobserved heterogeneity was contained in variables indicative of factors such 
as climate change regulatory policy, it is highly likely that the unobserved heterogeneity, and hence 
the individual effects, would be correlated with the independent variables i.e. factors such as climate 
change regulatory policy could influence explanatory variables. In the event that the strict exogeneity 
assumption for a RE model is not tenable, only FE estimators would be consistent. We then proceed 
to investigate the factors influencing energy intensity of the EU manufacturing sector by employing 
a fixed-effect estimator while incorporating time dummies as controls for factors that are constant 
across sectors and countries but vary over time such energy prices. The model specification for the 
static fixed effects model for subsector energy intensity is as follows:8 
 
𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 =   𝛽1𝑃𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 +    𝛽5𝐾/𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑃𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 
           +  𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                    (1) 
 
                                                          
8 Nevertheless, we use both estimators and carry out a Hausman test to select the specification that better suits our dataset. 
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where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 it is log energy intensity, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is log energy price, 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 is log of patent stock, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 
is the growth rate of value added, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡  is degree of trade openness, 𝐾/𝐿𝑖𝑡  is log of capital 
intensity,  𝑃𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the interaction between patent stock and energy price. The 𝛼𝑖 term is a 
fixed effect that allows for unobserved heterogeneity, 𝐷𝑡 is the year dummy capturing any time effect 
while  𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the idiosyncratic random error. 
 
   3.2 Asymmetric price response 
Past energy demand studies (see Dargay and Gately 1995; Gately and Huntington, 2002; Griffin and 
Schulman, 2005; and Huntington, 2006; Adeyemi and Hunt 2007, 2014; Olaniyan and Evans, 2014) 
have shown that energy prices have imperfect reversibility such that the responsiveness of demand in 
periods of high energy prices differs from the responsiveness in periods of falling prices. More 
importantly, these asymmetric price movements affect the level of technological change as higher 
prices tend to induce innovation or installation of more efficient capital stock which has important 
implications for energy intensity.  
 
Drawing on these studies, we decompose energy prices into three different components to determine 
to examine the asymmetric response of energy price. Energy prices in this study (the log of real 
subsector prices) are decomposed into three categories which are price maximum (𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥), price cut 
(𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡), and price recovery (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐), such that 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃1 + 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡   where 𝑃1 is the log of 
price in the initial year, 𝑡 = 1;  𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡  is the cumulative increase in log of maximum historical prices 
and is monotonically non-decreasing, i.e., 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡  ≥ 0. 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡 cumulative decrease in log of prices; 
monotonically non-decreasing 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑡,𝑡 ≤ 0: 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 cumulative sub-maximum increase in log of prices; 
monotonically non-decreasing: 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐,𝑡 ≥ 0. The fixed effects model in equation Eq (1) is generalised 
as  follows; 
 
       𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽𝑚𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛽𝑐𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑐 + 𝛽𝑟𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑟 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                           (2) 
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where 𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡  is the logarithm of the energy intensity for each subsector at time t, 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑚 is the logarithm 
of real price maximum for each subsector, 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑟   is the logarithm of real price recovery for each 
subsector while 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑐   is the logarithm of real price recovery for each subsector. 𝛼𝑖 accounts for the 
fixed effects to capture heterogeneity across country and industries, 𝐷𝑡 is a time dummy that accounts 
for specifications that change over time but that are constant across sectors, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  are the covariates as 
defined in Eq (1) above, while  𝐷𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 remain as earlier defined. 
 
4. Data Source and descriptive statistics 
Our analysis is based on panel data from 12 manufacturing subsectors at the two -digit level using 
the International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev 3 for 17 European countries over 
the period 1995–2009.  The selection of the 17 countries in our sample is determined manly by data 
availability, especially by data on our main variable of interest, industry-level patent data. Together, 
these countries account for over 80% of EU GVA. The manufacturing subsectors covered by our 
study are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix, which shows the ISIC rev3 classification of the 
industries. We measure energy intensity by the ratio of energy use input to gross value added. The 
data series for sector-specific measures of output, investment and energy use are obtained from the 
World Input–Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al., 2015). The measure of output is value added, 
which is expressed in millions of national currencies at current prices, is extracted from the Socio-
Economic Accounts section of the WIOD. The measure of output is value added in millions of 
national currencies, which we deflated using the sectorial price index of gross value added (where 
1995 = 100). The constant value series are then converted to international prices using the purchasing 
power parity exchange rates from the Penn World Table (PWT7.1). Gross energy use, which is 
measured in physical units (TJ), is extracted from the Environmental Accounts section of the WIOD. 
Capital intensity is expressed as a ratio of capital to labour. Real fixed capital stock is measured in 
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1995 prices and converted to million 1995 international dollars in a manner analogous to output and 
labour is measured as number of people engaged in work (in thousands). 
 
In the case of energy prices, previous studies (e.g. Sato and Dechezleprêtre, 2015; Parker and Liddle, 
2016) have relied on country-level industrial energy prices published by the US Energy Information 
Agency (EIA). Following Adetutu et al (2016), we constructed industry-specific energy prices as a 
ratio of intermediate energy input expenditure at current purchasers' prices to gross energy use (in 
TJ). This approach provides a more robust measure of industrial energy prices faced by each industry. 
The intermediate energy input expenditure is also obtained from WIOD and then deflated to constant 
prices (where 1995 = 100) by applying the implicit price deflator for each subsector. The constant 
price series are then converted to international prices using the purchasing power parity exchange 
rates from the Penn World Table (PWT7.1).  
 
The Patent variable include all patents granted by the European Patent Office over the study period. 
Past studies have lent credence to the superiority of patents to R&D as a potential proxy for innovation 
(see Popp, 2002, 2006; Ulku, 2007; Johnstone et al., 2010; Aghion et al., 2012). Patents granted are 
linked to industrial sectors using a concordance table between industries and technologies made 
available by the Fraunhofer Institute for System and Innovation Research.  Instead of using patent 
flows as a measure of innovation, we constructed patent stocks for each country following an 
approach proposed by Heeley et al (2000), which confines the depreciation of the patent stock to a 
period lasting only several years. The approach also addresses the problem of calculating initial patent 
stock in the perpetual inventory approach.  Similar to Blind and Jungmittag (2008), we assume a 
deprecation rate of 15% for the calculation of patent stocks and compute patent stocks as follows;   
                                           𝑃𝑛𝑡
= ∑ (1 − 𝜇)(𝑡−𝜏)
𝑡
𝜏=𝑡−5
𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑔𝑟                                                                                        (3)      
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where 𝑃𝑛𝑡
𝑔𝑟
 is the number of EPO patents granted to a given EU member state in country n in year t 
and 𝜇 is the depreciation rate. We interact patent stock with energy price in order to investigate the 
sectorial technological response to an increase in energy prices. We hypothesize that higher energy 
prices lead to the development of more energy-saving technologies thereby increasing innovative 
activities.  
 
 
Trade openness for each subsector is measured as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to 
output. Data for subsector exports and imports are accessed from the STAN database of the 
Organisation of Economic cooperation and Development (OECD).  Exports and imports are available 
in millions of local currency units from WIOD before deflating by base year 1995 sector-specific 
implicit gross domestic deflators taken from the same database. The constant (real) local currency 
units were then converted to 1995 international dollars using purchasing power parity conversion 
from Penn World Tables. We also control for output growth, which is measured as the rate of change 
of value-added of each sub-sector using value-added data extracted from the WIOD. We control for 
capital intensity which is measured as a ratio of capital and labour.   
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the levels of the key variables in 1995 across each country and 
Panel B presents the same for the changes through 2009. The ranking of countries looks sensible with 
the Germany having the highest patent stock (2080), followed by France (893) and UK (500). All 
countries have experienced significant investment in technological innovations as indicated by the 
growth in the patent stock in column (4) of Panel B, with the exception being the UK that experienced 
negative change. On average, the patent stock increased from 279 in 1995 to 345 in 2009. Germany 
had the fastest absolute change in the patent stock, increasing by 682.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Country 
 A: 1995 Levels Averaged by Country 
 
Energy  
Intensity 
(TJ/$M PPP) 
 ln (Value  
Added) 
 ($M PPP) 
Total  
Price 
($MPPP/TJ) 
Patent  
Stock 
(Number) 
Trade 
Openness 
(ratio) 
Share 
Gas & Electric 
(ratio) 
 11.297 7.677 0.009 108.893 4.191 0.608 
Country 12.216 7.773 0.012 94.472 7.016 0.552 
Denmark 8.775 6.903 0.004 65.890 6.011 0.537 
Finland 21.258 7.078 0.006 93.807 3.117 0.315 
France 13.142 9.219 0.014 893.734 3.100 0.614 
Germany 9.581 10.015 0.010 2080.386 2.666 0.563 
Greece 11.272 6.801 0.015 1.627 2.532 0.285 
Hungary 14.264 6.968 0.021 3.993 1.575 0.618 
Ireland 8.069 6.614 0.018 11.351 4.285 0.536 
Italy 9.103 9.735 0.015 290.701 1.622 0.654 
Luxembourg 12.423 4.738 0.007 13.348 0.000 0.645 
Netherlands 15.604 7.966 0.011 363.801 6.201 0.677 
Poland 22.381 8.153 0.011 0.555 0.891 0.243 
Portugal 13.096 7.267 0.011 0.592 3.141 0.301 
Spain 9.014 8.993 0.016 31.836 2.457 0.481 
Sweden 16.389 7.506 0.005 187.946 4.462 0.420 
United 
Kingdom 8.011 9.473 0.010 500.684 1.419 0.583 
Mean 12.701 7.832 0.011 279.036 3.233 0.507 
 
 
 
B: Changes from 1995 to 2009 Averaged by Country 
 
(Energy  
Intensity) 
(TJ/$M PPP) 
 ln (Value  
Added) 
 ($M PPP) 
(Total  
Price) 
($MPPP/TJ) 
(Patent  
Stock) 
(Number) 
(Trade 
Openness) 
(ratio) 
(Share 
Gas & Electric) 
(ratio) 
 
Country 
Austria -2.532 0.257 0.006 41.523 1.786 0.034 
Belgium -2.463 0.094 0.008 34.165 10.028 0.063 
Denmark -1.976 -0.240 0.006 23.701 21.252 0.062 
Finland -7.018 0.301 0.006 29.211 1.421 0.106 
France -5.769 0.337 0.014 80.976 -3.100 0.013 
Germany -1.918 0.083 0.019 682.715 1.787 0.041 
Greece -1.385 0.032 0.009 4.992 1.643 0.144 
Hungary 16.594 -0.491 -0.001 3.254 2.991 -0.063 
Ireland -0.696 0.344 0.002 15.899 1.889 -0.024 
Italy -0.299 -0.224 0.008 196.044 0.940 -0.004 
Luxembourg -1.934 0.337 0.008 20.004 20.847 -0.107 
Netherlands -3.243 0.083 0.010 7.950 6.550 -0.009 
Poland -12.792 0.471 0.016 9.688 -0.891 0.172 
Portugal 0.242 0.107 0.004 4.511 -3.141 0.226 
Spain 2.559 -0.057 0.001 55.722 -1.159 0.148 
Sweden -5.554 0.342 0.020 90.109 1.303 0.075 
United 
Kingdom -0.7285 -0.133 0.005 -117.767 0.381 0.031 
Mean -1.680 0.094 0.008 69.570 3.724 0.054 
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Poland has the most energy intensive countries and gained the largest efficiency improvement 
between 1995-2009 via reduction in energy intensity by over 57%. The mean energy intensity 
decreased by 8.4 % from 12.7 in 1995 to 11.021 in 2009. Hungary, Spain and Portugal witnessed an 
increase in energy intensity growth between 1995 and 2009. Appendix Table A3 also show similar 
cross-industry levels and growth in key variables.   
Figure 1: Cross Country Variation in Growth of Energy Intensity and Patent Stock, 1995-2009 
 
We also examine the correlation between energy intensity and patent stock by plotting bivariate 
scatter plots of growth in energy intensity and growth in patent stock for the 17 countries over the 
period 1995 – 2009. Figure 1 shows that change in energy intensity is negatively correlated with 
change in patent stock, with a correlation coefficient of −0.04. The directions of the correlation is 
expected and it is somewhat indicative of the empirical support for the hypothesis that technology 
improvements in specific processes and products, proxied by patent stock, will lead to a decline in 
energy intensity. The figure also shows Germany, the technology giant that is often a future indicator 
for other nations in the European Union. Regardless of the correlation, one should exercise caution 
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in the interpretation of the outcomes due to the inability of correlation to determine cause and effect.  
The relationship is investigated more rigorously using econometric analysis.  
 
5. Results and discussions 
The estimation models specified in equations (1) and (2) are reported in Tables 2 to 6 for industrial 
energy intensity. We model both price symmetric and asymmetric response of energy intensity to 
energy prices.  
 
               Table 2: Estimation results for EU manufacturing sector  
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables Random effects  Random effects  Fixed effects  Fixed effects  
Total Price -0.614***  -0.607***  
      (0.0241)  (0.0237)  
Price-max  -0.660***  -0.737*** 
  (0.0295)  (0.0309) 
Price-cut  -0.488***  -0.465*** 
  (0.0403)  (0.0382) 
Price-rec  -0.668***  -0.620*** 
  (0.0316)  (0.0343) 
Patent -0.174*** -0.0279** -0.120*** -0.0126 
     (0.0282) (0.0134) (0.0304) (0.0145) 
Openness  0.0940*** 0.0955*** 0.244*** 0.206*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0259) (0.0264) (0.0267) 
Growth-VA -0.389*** -0.414*** -0.355*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0453) (0.0441) 
Capital-intensity 0.0804*** 0.0726** -0.00803 -0.0127 
 (0.0305) (0.0324) (0.0333) (0.0326) 
Share-gas-electric -0.321*** -0.394*** -0.298*** -0.322*** 
 (0.0505) (0.0504) (0.0495) (0.0482) 
Patent*price -0.0286***  -0.0212***  
 (0.00518)  (0.00515)  
Patent*price-max  -0.0333***    -0.0231*** 
  (0.00587)  (0.00573) 
Patent*price-cut  0.00696  0.00546 
  (0.0105)  (0.0101) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.0225***  -0.0146** 
  (0.00675)  (0.00660) 
Constant -2.274*** 0.959** -4.268*** -0.611 
 (0.392) (0.408) (0.433) (0.423) 
     
Observations 2,197 2,197 2,197 2,197 
R-squared   0.637 0.660 
Year DVs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We estimate random effects and fixed effects estimators to avoid the potential bias associated with 
the pooled OLS due to the presence of unobservable sector-specific characteristics associated with 
panel data. In order to choose between the RE and FE estimators model, we conducted a Hausman 
(1978) test. The test statistic is based upon contrasting the FE and RE estimators in which the standard 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the conditional mean of the disturbances given the 
regressors is zero. Based on the statistical power of the test, the Hausman test suggests that fixed 
effects estimates are consistent. On this basis, we choose a fixed effects model as the appropriate 
model for our data and our subsequent analysis and discussions are premised on the fixed effect 
estimates in column (3) and (4) as reported in Table 2 and are used throughout the remainder of our 
study. 
 
From column (3), we can see that, as expected, energy price has a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with industrial energy intensity. Holding everything else constant, the elasticity of -0.61 
implies that a 1% higher energy price is associated with a 0.61% decline in energy intensity. Likewise, 
the impact of the patent stock is negative and statistically significant as is the interaction between the 
energy price and patent stock. Our results are consistent with the findings reported by Fisher-Vanden 
et al. (2016) for four Chinese energy-intensive industries.  Energy efficiency is driven by patent stock 
through two key influences: (i) energy efficiency improvement due to technological innovations 
which is independent of the level of energy prices and (ii) technological innovation induced by raising 
energy prices. In addition, energy price is highly significant for the three price components in the 
asymmetric energy price specification (column 4). The asymmetric energy price model gives insight 
into the varying magnitude of the impact of shifting energy prices. Energy price maximum has the 
highest statistically significant impact on energy intensity with a price elasticity of -0.74, followed 
by price recovery, -0.62, while energy price cut, -0.47, experiences the lowest impact of the three 
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asymmetric price components. These findings indicate that the pattern of price movements is crucial 
in stimulating energy efficiency improvement as price rises led to more efficiency improvements than 
when efficiency gains when prices are low. These results are consistent with Lescaroux (2008) who 
provides a related evidence of asymmetric response of efficiency to energy prices in the US 
manufacturing sector but contrasts with those of Parker and Liddle (2016). The patent stock 
coefficient has the expected negative sign and is robust in the symmetric price model, although it is 
insignificant in the asymmetric price model.  
 
Furthermore, the statistically significant coefficients of the interaction terms between patent and 
asymmetric price components indicates a higher reduction in energy intensity at the maximum energy 
price level, potentially due to adoption of more efficient energy substitute and development of 
technological innovation. On the contrary, the interaction term shows no significant impact on energy 
intensity at low prices as there is less incentive for process innovation to reduce energy use when 
energy prices are low. These findings are not surprising given the short panel framework of our data 
coupled with the relative persistent rising energy price during the sample period.    
 
The impact of value-added growth rate on energy intensity is negative and robust across the model 
specifications. In line with other studies (see Jimenez and Mercado, 2014), our finding suggests that 
an increase in output level using the same level of fixed input tend to enhance energy efficiency. 
Although not quite robust, the result also shows that the coefficient of capital intensity is negatively 
associated with energy intensity. This implies that as stock of capital increases as a result 
accumulation of more energy efficient capital stock in relation to labour, energy intensity tends to 
decrease.  Conversely, the result also shows that increases in international trade appears to raise 
energy intensity in the EU manufacturing sector.  Zhang (2013) finds a similar result that energy 
intensity slightly increases with the increase in trade openness for the Eastern Europe transition 
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economies manufacturing sector. One reason adduced to the finding of positive relationship of trade 
openness and energy intensity stems from the hypothesis that trade induces specialization in more 
energy intensive industries. Also, the impact of state aids by EU member countries reinforces support 
for international competitiveness of these specialised trade exposed energy intensive sectors. We will 
expect that the higher the share of gas and electricity in the total energy use, the greater the corporate 
pressure to reduce prices9. Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) report that fuel switching, shifting the 
fuel mix away from coal in favour of natural gas, has been responsible for the major share of the 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions since the EU ETS was instituted in 2005.  Overall, the estimates 
in Table 2 confirm that energy prices in general do play a crucial role in reducing energy intensity. It 
also reflects a pattern consistent with the notion that rising energy prices could directly engender 
energy efficiency as well as the indirect effect of stimulating energy-saving technology development 
and adoption.  
 
Focusing on Table 3, we account for sectoral heterogeneities on the assumption that factors will affect 
industries differently owing to their variation in energy intensity and exposure to the Emission 
Trading Directive and other emission reduction obligations, such as carbon or energy taxes. To 
explore these heterogeneities, we first split of our sample into two subsamples i.e. energy-intensive 
and non-energy intensive industries. Building on existing literature (see Liddle, 2012; Sato and 
Dechezleprêtre, 2015; Song and Oh, 2015), we consider four energy-intensive industries: paper (ISIC 
21-22), chemicals (ISIC 24), non-metallic products (ISIC 26), basic and fabricated metal (ISIC 27-
28). The other eight industries are categorised as less-energy intensive manufacturing industries. The 
immediate striking difference between the fixed effects estimates of the energy-intensive and less 
energy-intensive sectors lies in the statistical significance of patent stock in both fixed effect models 
of energy-intensive industries as opposed to less-energy intensive industries where the patent stock 
                                                          
9 We expect different sectors to have different fuel mix given that different fuel mix drive responses such as investment. 
The reason we have to control fuel mix as well as heterogeneity.  
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coefficient is not statistically different from zero. The larger coefficients for the patent stock of the 
energy-intensive industries suggests that heavy industries rely more on innovation to reduce energy 
intensity compared with light industries. Energy price elasticities remain negative across the models 
and statistically significant for both industries, with less-intensive industries responding more to price 
increases than energy-intensive industries. Given the relative price sensitivity of the less-intensive 
industries, price increases account for more induced technological innovation in lighter 
manufacturing industries compared to energy-intensive industries. One possible explanation is that 
in less-intensive industries investments in energy-efficient technologies are driven largely by energy 
prices, while policies related to environmental concerns could be responsible for the propensity for 
innovation in energy-intensive industries.  This finding implies that price elasticities of energy-
intensive industries are more inelastic than those of less-intensive industries. Similar to the price 
decomposition estimates of the manufacturing industries reported in Table 2, the magnitude of the 
impact of price is seen to be highest at the maximum price level, followed by price-recovery while 
price-cut has the lowest price impact on energy intensity.  
 
More often than not, industrial energy policies across different European countries are tailored to 
meet country-specific industrial strategies. For instance, in order to reduce CO2 emissions, countries 
like Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Poland have unilaterally adopted of carbon tax dating back to 
the early 1990s10. A carbon tax policy is aimed at promoting substitution of fuel products and thereby 
encouraging energy saving as well as investment in energy efficiency improvement.  Even for an EU-
wide mechanism such as the ETS, in Phases I and II of the scheme (2005-7 and 2008-12), countries 
were allowed to set the allocation of individual allowances, allowing for considerable differences to 
arise. These inter-regional differences in climate change and energy policy will undoubtedly have an 
                                                          
10 The Nordic countries were the first countries to levy carbon taxes. Finland imposed a carbon tax in 1990; Norway and 
Sweden in 1991; and Denmark in 1992.   Poland also imposed a carbon tax in 1990, which was (and remained) much 
lower than those in the Nordic countries (World Bank, 2016). 
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impact on regional energy consumption and regional energy intensity.  Therefore, one way to possibly 
gain a more intuitive insight into geographical variation in energy intensity of European countries is  
Table 3: Estimation result for manufacturing sector groups 
 Energy intensive         
industries 
   Less-Energy 
   industries 
intensive 
Variables Fixed effect Fixed effect    Fixed effect Fixed effect 
     
Total Price -0.502***  -0.669***  
 (0.0343)  (0.0318)  
Price-max    -0.675***  -0.855*** 
  (0.0573)  (0.0393) 
Price-cut  -0.415***  -0.499*** 
  (0.0641)  (0.0482) 
Price-rec  -0.0856  -0.704*** 
  (0.0857)  (0.0426) 
Patent   -0.138** -0.0921*** -0.0848** 0.0249 
  (0.0542) (0.0216) (0.0375) (0.0197) 
Openness   0.301*** 0.338*** 0.208*** 0.142*** 
  (0.0380) (0.0375) (0.0349) (0.0356) 
Growth-VA  -0.229*** -0.285*** -0.374*** -0.419*** 
 (0.0686) (0.0664) (0.0578) (0.0557) 
Capital_intensity          0.0162 0.0386 -0.0245 -0.0492 
 (0.0485) (0.0470) (0.0435) (0.0428) 
Share-gas-electric -0.452*** -0.482*** -0.191*** -0.227*** 
 (0.0706) (0.0684) (0.0646) (0.0622) 
Patent*price -0.0141*  -0.0215***  
 (0.00817)  (0.00676)  
Patent*price-max  0.00385  -0.0176** 
  (0.0130)  (0.00705) 
Patent*price-cut  0.00520  0.00728 
  (0.0178)  (0.0125) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.0861***  -0.0101 
  (0.0221)  (0.00823) 
Constant -3.746*** -1.469** -4.488*** -0.325 
 (0.640) (0.592) (0.565) (0.561) 
     
Observations 785 785 1,412 1,412 
R-squared 0.628 0.657 0.660 0.689 
Year DVs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                      Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Estimation results for regional groups 
         Western  Europe          Southern  Europe          Eastern  Europe          Northern  Europe 
Variables   Fixed effect Fixed effect     Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect 
Total Price -0.556***  -0.594***  -0.528***  -0.429***  
 (0.0371)  (0.0543)  (0.0472)  (0.0951)  
Price-max  -0.543***  -0.694***  -0.389***  -0.822*** 
  (0.0486)  (0.0644)     (0.108)  (0.0936) 
Price-cut  -0.774***  -0.0366  -0.674***  -1.409*** 
  (0.0608)  (0.0651)     (0.128)  (0.207) 
Price-rec  -0.678***  -0.601***    -0.336**  -0.514*** 
  (0.0525)  (0.0618)     (0.148)  (0.125) 
Patent -0.00410 0.0697** -0.280*** -0.0650** -0.469*** 0.0897** -0.448*** -0.185*** 
 (0.0458) (0.0297) (0.0851) (0.0290)    (0.0933)    (0.0355) (0.0873) (0.0538) 
Openness 0.313*** 0.247*** 0.332*** 0.415***   -0.0405   -0.0247 0.563*** 0.493*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0355) (0.0740) (0.0643)    (0.0996)    (0.103) (0.0699) (0.0641) 
Growth-VA -0.262*** -0.266*** -0.425*** -0.437***   -0.205   -0.121 -0.213** -0.291*** 
 (0.0619) (0.0607) (0.0957) (0.0817)    (0.128)    (0.128) (0.103) (0.0938) 
Capital-intensity -0.0630 -0.0111 -0.0919 -0.0931   -0.0343   -0.0105 0.0909 0.0115 
 (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0871) (0.0755)    (0.0756)    (0.0796) (0.0886) (0.0831) 
Share-gas-electric -0.148** -0.108* -0.299** -0.341*** -0.934*** -1.215*** -0.902*** -0.721*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0628) (0.119) (0.105)    (0.214)     (0.220) (0.135) (0.128) 
Patent*total price -0.0137*  -0.0510***  -0.0988***  -0.0515***  
 (0.00752)  (0.0168)     (0.0196)  (0.0172)  
Patent*price-max  -0.0214**  -0.0907***  -0.141***  -0.00553 
  (0.00841)  (0.0161)  (0.0339)  (0.0163) 
Patent*price-cut  0.0662***  -0.167***      0.0660  0.259*** 
  (0.0142)  (0.0224)  (0.0558)  (0.0440) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.000281  -0.0928***  -0.154***  0.0237 
  (0.0100)  (0.0169)  (0.0376)  (0.0234) 
Carbon-tax - - - - - - -0.130*** -0.144*** 
       (0.0342) (0.0300) 
Constant -5.433*** -1.896*** -4.809*** -2.881*** 1.199 3.227** -7.473*** -3.946*** 
 (0.586) (0.576) (1.072) (0.931) (1.548) (1.512)) (1.261) (1.058) 
         
Observations 1,108 1,108 493 493 200 200 396 396 
R-squared 0.612 0.632 0.599 0.718 0.775 0.784 0.860 0.888 
Year DVs       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Fixed Effects       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                             Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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through regional analysis. We aggregate the 17 countries into four regions (Western Europe, Southern 
Europe, Eastern Europe and Northern Europe) to analyze any regional patterns while controlling for 
carbon tax11.   
 
No carbon tax estimate is reported in Table 4 for the other three regions as none of the countries in 
these regions introduced an effective carbon tax during the sample period.12  Interestingly, the results 
show a negative and robust relationship between carbon tax and energy intensity in Northern Europe. 
Specifically, the carbon tax estimates of approximately -0.13 and -0.14 in both fixed effects models 
respectively for Northern Europe suggest that 1% increase in carbon tax will lead to 0.13% and 0.14% 
respectively in improvement of energy efficiency.  
 
The comparison of the patent coefficients suggests a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with energy intensity across models in Northern and Southern Europe. The magnitude of the 
parameter estimates for the patent stock for Northern Europe is almost twice as large as the estimates 
of Southern Europe, possibly due to the existence of carbon tax which provides an incentive for 
induced innovation towards technologies that reduce emissions. A similar patent effect can be 
observed in Eastern Europe in the symmetric price model. Invariably, this underscores the assumption 
that environmental policies and regulations offer an important avenue for promoting technological 
innovation in the manufacturing sector. The picture is less clear-cut in the Western and Eastern 
European regions as the patent estimates have conflicting signs (although it is not significant for the 
price symmetric model in Western Europe). 
 
                                                          
11 See Appendix Table A2 for the regional classification of the 17 sample countries.  
12 Technically, as Zylicz (2013) explains, Poland does have a very small carbon tax of 0.24 PLN/t (0.06 euro/t) – 
roughly 1% of EU-ETS prices, which is well below the Pigouvian level understood as the level necessary to undertake 
the abatement at the socially justified (efficient) scale.  Different countries in the three regions also had a range of other 
measures, for example, the UK created a ‘Climate Change Levy’, but this applied to all central generating plants and 
included nuclear power, which does not emit CO2.    
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The coefficient of total energy price is negative and significantly affects energy intensity in all the 
groups as expected. We observe fairly large responses of energy intensity to price changes across 
each region, with Northern Europe having the lowest price effect on energy intensity in the price 
symmetric model. Compared with average price for the EU manufacturing sector, price elasticities 
for individual regions is lower than price elasticity of the full sample.   
 
The absence of a carbon tax that would encourage energy efficiency improvement in Western and 
Southern Europe invariably feeds into the energy price estimates as it can be observed that the 
magnitude of price elasticities are slightly larger than in other regions. Furthermore, capital intensity 
is negatively associated with energy intensity in Western and Southern Europe. The finding is 
consistent with the non-significance of patent stock on energy intensity in the Southern European 
manufacturing sector. Moreover, it is not surprising that trade openness continues to have the same 
positive and robust effect on manufacturing sector energy intensity. Although in separating the data 
into four regions, we might have expected that net exporting regions with a positive trade balance 
might behave differently from other regions, the results show otherwise. Hence, the findings do not 
change in the face of regional heterogeneities.  By contrast, trade openness seems to show a negative 
relationship with energy intensity in Eastern Europe where, possibly due to the impact of the market-
oriented policy approach implemented in this region which facilitated trade inflow during the 
transition period from communism into market economies in the early 1990s.  
 
We investigate whether the determining factors yield different impacts on energy intensity in some 
energy-intensive sectors that are exposed to emission reductions policy. We consider three major 
sectors; pulp & paper, non-metallic mineral products (e.g., construction materials, glass, ceramics, 
cement) and basic and fabricated metals, which are covered by the EU ETS and compare these sectors 
with the chemicals industry, which was not covered by the ETS during our sample period. Consistent 
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with our earlier findings, the fixed effect results presented in Table 5 shows that the coefficients of 
energy price are all negative and statistically significant in the price symmetric model. However, 
these subsectors have a lower price effect when compared with the price elasticity of the chemicals 
industry. This could partly be explained by these subsectors having internalised energy efficiency due 
to the emissions policy in place at the time, which would make energy intensity less responsive to 
energy price in these industries. 
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Table 5: Model estimations for ETS-covered industries 
 ETS-covered Sectors      Non ETS-covered Sector 
VARIABLES Paper  Non-Metallic  Basic Metal  Chemicals 
         
Price -0.389***  -0.351***  -0.481***  -0.680***  
 (0.0422)  (0.0940)  (0.0842)  (0.0784)  
         
Price-max  -0.717***  -0.277*  -1.020***  -0.844*** 
  (0.104)  (0.148)  (0.153)  (0.102) 
Price-cut  -0.183***  -0.466***  -0.236  -1.316*** 
  (0.0702)  (0.144)  (0.195)  (0.197) 
Price-rec  -0.0146  -0.213  0.563**  -0.637*** 
  (0.117)  (0.166)  (0.238)  (0.192) 
Openness 0.313*** 0.322*** 0.579*** 0.544*** -0.0432 -0.00838 0.822*** 0.762*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0645) (0.0728) (0.0952) (0.0846) (0.0833) (0.0917) (0.0921) 
Patent 0.0836 -0.0393 0.0308 0.0246 0.0952 -0.0391 -0.0817 0.118 
 (0.0763) (0.0338) (0.130) (0.0513) (0.120) (0.0415) (0.150) (0.0738) 
Growth-VA -0.236* -0.223* -0.268** -0.279** -0.312** -0.386*** -0.175 -0.280** 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.113) (0.117) (0.145) (0.139) (0.125) (0.126) 
Capital-intensity 0.00414 0.0267 -0.428*** -0.430*** 0.0728 0.132 -0.188 -0.124 
 (0.0849) (0.0897) (0.0916) (0.100) (0.0864) (0.0845) (0.121) (0.119) 
Share-gas-electric -0.316*** -0.400*** -0.506*** -0.512*** -0.419** -0.436** -0.224* -0.290** 
 (0.107) (0.117) (0.148) (0.148) (0.165) (0.177) (0.118) (0.116) 
Patent*price 0.0289**  -0.00177  0.0310*  -0.0219  
 (0.0134)  (0.0202)  (0.0183)  (0.0175)  
Patent*price-max  0.128***  -0.0141  0.128***  0.0287 
  (0.0345)  (0.0288)  (0.0323)  (0.0240) 
 
Patent*price-cut  -0.0429*  0.0307  -0.0194  0.106** 
  (0.0238)  (0.0381)  (0.0411)  (0.0529) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.0779**  -0.000185  -0.189***  -0.00307 
  (0.0309)  (0.0397)  (0.0568)  (0.0508) 
Constant -3.851*** -2.236** -4.941*** -2.554** 1.000 2.696** -12.31*** -8.373*** 
 (0.967) (1.081) (1.216) (1.280) (1.415) (1.238) (1.688) (1.484) 
         
Observations 206 206 183 183 206 206 190 190 
R-squared 0.575 0.609 0.667 0.681 0.698 0.732 0.850 0.865 
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Year DVs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
              Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Similarly, for the price asymmetric model, reduction in energy intensity is also associated with price-
max, as it is negative and robust across the three covered sectors, as well as in the chemicals industry. 
Unlike the average patent effect seen for the energy-intensive industries in Table 3, we cannot 
establish any significant impact on energy intensity from patent stock in either model. This also 
applies to the interaction of patent with energy maximum price, except for the non-metallic industry 
in asymmetric price model. However, since our sample only covers the first phase (2005-7) and two 
years out of the second phase (2008-12) of the ETS, this might be responsible for the lack of clear 
impact of technological innovation on these industries. Nevertheless, the asymmetric price model 
shows estimated coefficients of interaction terms between patent and price recovery for basic paper 
and metal industries appear to be significant. Again, the magnitude of the positive coefficient of trade 
openness for chemical industry further reinforces our earlier findings that trade induces specialization 
in more energy-intensive industries. Another notable observation is the statistical significance and 
negative effect on energy intensity of growth in value added growth rate and the share of gas and 
electricity. The statistical significance of the coefficients of both variables is clear across the four 
sectors, possibly as output expands in the face of fixed assets thereby ensuring optimal efficiency of 
energy use.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Energy intensity in the EU manufacturing sector has witnessed a substantial decline in energy 
intensity over last three decades. A great deal of debate about the determining factors of energy 
intensity has been centred on the decomposed energy efficiency indices as opposed to the direct effect 
of technological innovation. The implication of technological effects arising from the decomposition 
analysis is the tendency within each sector to reduce energy intensity, which does not necessarily 
imply adoption of more efficient technologies. Hence, we have focused on the direct impact of 
technology innovation instead of the broader concept of technological effects, which captures very 
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diverse drivers. We attempted to investigate the impact of several factors influencing energy intensity 
across 12 industries in 17 EU countries.  To test our hypotheses, we use variables that captures these 
influencing factors, for instance, we use a unique industry-level patent data as a proxy for 
technological innovation. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study that attempts to empirically 
analyze the direct role of technological innovation plays on energy intensity in the manufacturing 
sector using a unique industry-level patent data, which covers many EU countries. 
 
We set out some testable hypotheses under the following categories - patent, energy prices, trade 
openness, capital intensity and carbon tax- to investigate the determinants of energy intensity across 
the EU manufacturing industries. The asymmetric response of industrial energy intensity to price via 
decomposition of energy price into three components was investigated. We also explore 
heterogeneities across industry categories, distinguishing between energy-intensive and less energy-
intensive industries and examining regional differences in industrial energy intensity. 
 
In tandem with our first hypothesis, energy price remains the major determinant of energy intensity 
in EU manufacturing sectors, although industries results show that energy intensity falls more in  
respond to higher price  than less energy-intensive industries. The second hypothesis is also confirmed 
by our findings which show that patent stock seems to be consistently lead to a fall in overall industrial 
energy intensity, with a much stronger effect in energy-intensive industries with an estimated 
coefficient of -0.138 as opposed to less energy-intensive industries with an estimated parameter of -
0.085. The result suggests that heavy industries rely more on innovation in reducing energy intensity 
compared with light industries.  Technological innovation induced by rising energy prices, as 
measured by the patent and price interaction, is consistently associated with a decline in 
manufacturing energy intensity. In particular, the study shows that the decline in energy intensity is 
much more sensitive to maximum price changes than price cut, implying the evidence of asymmetric 
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response of efficiency to energy prices in which price rises between 2004 and 2008 of the sample 
period result in more efficiency improvements than when prices falls. We could not validate our third 
hypothesis as capital intensity do not seem to have any significant impact on energy intensity.  
 
Although trade openness is generally believed to contribute to declining energy intensity in the EU 
owing to potential spillover effects as set out in our fourth hypothesis, our analysis indicates that 
energy intensity rises substantially with increased trade openness in the manufacturing sector. This 
increasing effect of trade openness on energy intensity is also observed across the industries.  
 
Furthermore, our analysis of regional disparities indicates the implementation of a carbon tax has 
significantly reduced energy intensity in Northern Europe. Thus, there is a clear negative relationship 
between the level of the carbon tax and energy intensity in those countries where a carbon tax has 
been employed, which support our fifth hypothesis.  The cumulative effect of carbon taxes over the 
years following its implementation in the Nordic countries in the early 1990s has caused energy 
intensity to fall by encouraging the adoption of low carbon and energy-saving technologies. Chemical 
industry seems to be more susceptible to energy prices relative to other ETS-covered energy-intensive 
industries which underscores the hypothesis that  non ETS-covered covered has a lower price 
elasticity than those energy-intensive sectors covered by the ETS. In addition, the impact of patent 
stock also exhibits different outcome across regions, with negative impact on energy intensity 
established for only Southern Europe and Northern Europe which could be explained by different 
environmental and energy policy strategies each EU countries national government.  
 
Overall, our study provides some policy implications for enhancing manufacturing energy efficiency 
in the EU region. First, technological innovation offers potential opportunities for the improvement 
of energy efficiency and development of new lower carbon-emission technologies, especially in the 
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energy -intensive industries.  Second, the ETS policy facilitates efficiency improvement and offers a 
potential for reducing the susceptibility of energy-intensive industries to energy prices. Although, the 
policy could increase the risk of leakage as inefficient firms who should be responsive to energy price 
are being driven out of the market. Third, a complementarity of unilateral national carbon tax policy 
with EU ETS policy would play a crucial role in realising efficiency gains, especially across the 
Western European and Southern European countries. Third, the frequency of adjustments in climate 
change policy in line with changing global energy price will largely influence potential energy saving, 
for instance, in the less energy -intensive industries. Although the potential increase in energy 
intensity arising from international trade, government interventions in the form of state aids still exist 
in some of these sectors which could further weaken efficiency improvement effort or offset leakage 
that increases global emissions. Finally, governmental initiatives for energy conservation in the 
industrial sector that are meant to accelerate investments in clean technologies is recommended.  
 
 
 
 
References 
Abrell, J. (2010). Regulating CO2 emissions of transportation in Europe: A CGE-analysis using 
market-based instruments. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 15(4): 235-
239. 
Adetutu, M.O., A.J. Glass, and T.G. Weyman-Jones. (2016). Decomposing energy demand across 
BRIIC countries. Energy Economics 54: 396-404. 
Adeyemi, O.I. and L.C. Hunt. (2007). Modelling OECD industrial energy demand: asymmetric price 
responses and energy-saving technical change. Energy Economics 29: 693–709. 
Adeyemi, O.I. and L.C. Hunt. (2014). Accounting for asymmetric price responses and underlying 
energy demand trends in OECD industrial energy demand. Energy Economics, 45: 435-444. 
Aghion, P., A. Dechezleprêtre, D. Hemous, R. Martin, R. and J. Van Reenen, (2016). Carbon taxes, 
path dependency, and directed technical change: Evidence from the auto industry. Journal of Political 
Economy 124(1): 1-51. 
38 
 
Anadon, L., Bunn, M., Chan, G., Chan, M., Jones, C., Kempener, R., Lee, A., Logar, N., 
Narayanamurti, V., 2011. Transforming U.S. energy innovation. Energy Technology Innovation 
Policy Research Group. Belfer Center for Social and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Atalla, T. and P. Bean, P (2017). Determinants of energy productivity in 39 countries: An empirical 
investigation. Energy Economics 62: 217-229. 
Bernard, A.B., V. Smeets, and F. Warzynski. (2017). Rethinking deindustrialization. Economic 
Policy, 32(89): 5-38 
Birol, F. and J.H. Keppler, (2000). Prices, technology development and the rebound effect. Energy 
Policy, 28(6-7): 457-469. 
Blind, K. and A. Jungmittag. (2008). The impact of patents and standards on macroeconomic growth: 
a panel approach covering four countries and 12 sectors. Journal of Productivity Analysis 29(1): 51-
60. 
Boyd, G., J.F. McDonald, M. Ross, and D.A. Hanson. (1987). Separating the changing composition 
of US manufacturing production from energy efficiency improvements: a Divisia index 
approach. The Energy Journal 8(2): 77-96. 
Boyd, G.A. and J.M. Roop. (2004). A note on the Fisher ideal index decomposition for structural 
change in energy intensity. The Energy Journal 25(1): 87-101. 
Calel, R. and A. Dechezleprêtre. (2016). Environmental policy and directed technological change: 
evidence from the European carbon market. Review of Economics and Statistics 98(1): 173-191. 
CEPS, (2014). Composition and Drivers of Energy Prices and Costs in Energy Intensive Industries: 
“The Case of Ceramics. Flat Glass and Chemical Industries'', CEPS Special Report, Brussels. 
Cornillie, J. and Fankhauser, S., (2004). The energy intensity of transition countries. Energy 
Economics, 26(3): 283-295. 
Dargay, J.M. and D. Gately. (1995). The imperfect price-reversibility of non-transport oil demand in 
the OECD. Energy Economics 17(1): 59–71. 
Demailly, D. and P. Quirion. (2006). CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European 
cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering versus output-based allocation. Climate 
Policy 6(1): 93-113. 
Diewert, W.E. (2001). The consumer price index and index number theory: a survey. Department of 
Economics University of British Columbia, discussion paper 01, 2. 
EBRD (2010). Transition Report 2010: Recovery and Reform. Report of the Office of the Chief 
Economist, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London. Available on:  
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/tr10.pdf 
39 
 
 
European Council. (2013). The European Council in 2013. Available on: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21303/qcao13001enc.pdf (Accessed on 4 April 2018). 
Fisher-Vanden, K., Y. Hu, G. Jefferson, M. Rock and M., Toman. (2016). Factors influencing energy 
intensity in four Chinese industries. The Energy Journal 37(1): 153 -178. 
 
Gallagher, K.S., A. Grübler, L. Kuhl, G. Nemet and C. Wilson. (2012). The energy technology 
innovation system. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 37: 137-162. 
 
Gately, D. and H.G. Huntington. (2002). The asymmetric effects of changes in price and income on 
energy and oil demand. Energy Journal 23(1): 19–55. 
Griffin, J.M. and C.T., Schulman. (2005). Price asymmetry in energy demand models: a proxy for 
energy-saving technical change? The Energy Journal 26(1): 1–21. 
Griffith, Rachel, Elena Huergo, Jacques Mairesse, and Bettina Peters. (2006). "Innovation and 
productivity across four European countries." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(4): 483-498. 
Heeley M.B., A. Khorana, S.F. Matusik. (2000). Underpricing and the Long-run Financial 
Performance of IPOs: Information Asymmetry and Firm Incentive Capability. In: Reynolds D (ed.) 
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research – Proceedings of the 19th Annual Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference 1999, Babson College 
Hausman, J.A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46: 1251–1271. 
Huntington, H.G. (2006). A note on price asymmetry as induced technical change. Energy Journal 
27: 1–7. 
Huntington, H.G. (2010). Structural change and U.S. energy use: recent patterns. Energy Journal 31: 
25–39.  
Jaffe, A. B., R.G. Newell, and R.N. Stavins, (2004). Economics of energy efficiency. Encyclopedia 
of Energy 2: 79-90. 
Jimenez, R. and J. Mercado. (2014). Energy intensity: a decomposition and counterfactual exercise 
for Latin American countries. Energy Economics 42: 161-171. 
Johnstone, N., I. Haščič, and D. Popp, D. (2010). Renewable energy policies and technological 
innovation: evidence based on patent counts. Environmental and Resource Economics 45(1): 133-
155. 
Karimu, A., R. Brännlund, T. Lundgren, and P. Söderholm. (2017). Energy intensity and convergence 
in Swedish industry: A combined econometric and decomposition analysis. Energy Economics 62: 
347-356. 
40 
 
Lescaroux, F. (2008). Decomposition of US manufacturing energy intensity and elasticities of 
components with respect to energy prices. Energy Economics 30: 1068–1080. 
Liddle, B. (2010). Revisiting world energy intensity convergence for regional differences. Applied 
Energy 87: 3218–3225 
Liddle, B. (2012). The importance of energy quality in energy intensive manufacturing: Evidence 
from panel cointegration and panel FMOLS. Energy Economics 34(6): 1819-1825. 
Ma, C. and D.L. Stern (2008). China's changing energy intensity trend: a decomposition analysis. 
Energy Economics 30: 1037–1053. 
Ma, H., L. Oxley, and J. Gibson. (2009). Substitution possibilities and determinants of energy 
intensity for China. Energy Policy 37(5): 1793-1804. 
Ma, C. and D.I. Stern. (2008). China's changing energy intensity trend: A decomposition 
analysis. Energy Economics 30(3): 1037-1053. 
Marrero, G.A. and F.J., Ramos-Real. (2013). Activity sectors and energy intensity: decomposition 
analysis and policy implications for European countries (1991–2005). Energies 6: 2521–2540.  
Metcalf, G.E. (2008). An empirical analysis of energy intensity and its determinants at the state 
level. The Energy Journal 29(3): 1-26. 
Mulder, P. (2015). International specialization, sector structure and the evolution of manufacturing 
energy intensity in OECD countries. The Energy Journal 36(3): 111-136.  
Mulder, P. and H.L.F. de Groot. (2011). Energy productivity performance across 14 OECD countries: 
the role of energy-extensive sectors. In: Florax, R.J.G.M., De Groot, H.L.F., Mulder, P. (Eds.), 
Improving Energy Efficiency Through Technology: Trends, Investment Behaviour and Policy Design. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos, UK.  
Mulder, P. and H.L.F. de Groot. (2012). Structural change and convergence of energy intensity across 
OECD countries, 1970–2005. Energy Economics 34: 1910–1921.  
Mulder, P., de Groot, H.L.F., Pfeiffer, B., 2014. Dynamics and determinants of energy intensity in 
the service sector: a cross-country analysis, 1980–2005. Ecological Economics 100: 1–15. 
OECD, 2011. STAN Industry Rev. 3, 2008, STAN: OECD Structural Analysis Statistics (database) 
Olaniyan, M.J. and J. Evans. (2014). The importance of engaging residential energy customers' hearts 
and minds. Energy Policy 69: 273-284. 
Oseni, M.O. (2009). Analysis of energy intensity and its determinants in 16 OECD countries.  Journal 
of Energy and Development 35(1/2): 101-140. 
 
Parker, S. and B. Liddle. (2016). Energy efficiency in the manufacturing sector of the OECD: 
Analysis of price elasticities. Energy Economics 58: 38-45. 
41 
 
Petrick, S. and Wagner, U., 2014. The impact of carbon trading on industry: Evidence from German 
manufacturing firms (No. 1912). Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). 
Popp, D.C. (2001). The effect of new technology on energy consumption. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 23(3): 215-239. 
Popp, D. (2006). International innovation and diffusion of air pollution control technologies: the 
effects of NOX and SO2 regulation in the US, Japan, and Germany. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 51(1): 46-71. 
Sato, M. and A. Dechezleprêtre. (2015). Asymmetric industrial energy prices and international 
trade. Energy Economics 52: S130-S141. 
Sato, M., K. Neuhoff, V. Graichen, K. Schumacher and F. Matthes. (2015). Sectors under scrutiny: 
evaluation of indicators to assess the risk of carbon leakage in the UK and Germany. Environmental 
and Resource Economics 60(1): 99-124. 
Schmoch, U., F. Laville, P. Patel. and R. Frietsch. (2003). Linking technology areas to industrial 
sectors. Final Report to the European Commission, DG Research, 1(0), p.100. 
Shahiduzzaman, M. and K. Alam. (2013). Changes in energy efficiency in Australia: a decomposition 
of aggregate energy intensity using logarithmic mean Divisia approach. Energy Policy 56: 341–351.  
Steinbuks, J., and K. Neuhoff. (2014). Assessing energy price induced improvements in efficiency of 
capital in OECD manufacturing industries. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 68(2): 340-356. 
Sue Wing, I. (2008). Explaining the declining energy intensity of the U.S. economy. Resource and 
Energy Economics 30(1): 21–49. 
Song, C. and W. Oh. (2015). Determinants of innovation in energy intensive industry and implications 
for energy policy. Energy Policy 81: 122-130. 
Stöllinger, R., (2016). Structural change and global value chains in the EU. Empirical Journal of 
European Economics 43(4): 801-829 
Timmer, M.P., E. Dietzenbacher, B. Los, R. Stehrer, and G.J. Vries. (2015). An illustrated user guide 
to the world input–output database: the case of global automotive production.  Review of International 
Economics, 23(3): 575-605.  
 
Ulku, H. (2007). R&D, innovation, and growth: evidence from four manufacturing sectors in OECD 
countries. Oxford Economic Papers 59(3): 513-535. 
Unander, F. (2007). Decomposition of manufacturing energy-use in IEA countries: how do recent 
developments compare with historical long-term trends? Applied Energy 84: 771–780.  
42 
 
Van Looy, B., C. Vereyen and U. Schmoch. (2014). Patent Statistics: Concordance IPC V8–NACE 
Rev. 2. Eurostat, European Commission, Luxembourg. 
Voigt, S., E. De Cian, M. Schymura, and E. Verdolini. (2014). Energy intensity developments in 40 
major economies: structural change or technology improvement? Energy Economics 41: 47–62.  
Welsch, H., and C. Ochsen. (2005).  The determinants of aggregate energy use in West Germany: 
factor substitution, technological change, and trade." Energy Economics 27(1): 93-111. 
Wan, J., K. Baylis, and P. Mulder. (2015). Trade-facilitated technology spillovers in energy 
productivity convergence processes across EU countries. Energy Economics 48: 253–264.  
World Bank, Ecofys, and Vivid Economics. (2016). State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2016. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25160 License: 
CC BY 3.0 IGO 
Wu, Y. (2012). Energy intensity and its determinants in China's regional economies. Energy Policy 
41: 703–711 
Zhang, F. (2013). The energy transition of the transition economies: An empirical analysis. Energy 
Economics, 40: 679-686. 
Zylicz, T., 2013. Choosing efficient combinations of policy instruments for low-carbon development 
and innovation to achieve Europe’s 2050 climate targets. Country report: Poland. Cecilia 2050 
Optimal EU Climate Policy.  Available on 
https://cecilia2050.eu/system/files/%C5%BBylicz%20%282013%29_Country%20Report%20-%20
Poland.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
43 
 
Appendix  
Table A1: Sectoral classification 
  
Industry ISIC rev3  
Food, beverages and tobacco 15-16 
Textiles and textile 17-18 
Leather, leather products and footwear 19 
Wood and of wood and cork 20 
Pulp, paper, paper, printing and publishing 21-22 
Chemicals and chemical 24 
Rubber and plastics 25 
Other non-metallic mineral 26 
Basic metals and fabricated metal 27-28 
Machinery, nec 29 
Electrical and optical equipment 30-33 
Transport equipment 34-35 
 
                  Table A2: Regional classification of Countries 
Western Europe Southern Europe Eastern Europe     Northern Europe  
     
Austria          Greece      Hungary          Denmark  
Belgium          Italy      Poland          Finland  
France          Portugal           Sweden  
Germany          Spain    
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
    
Netherlands     
United Kingdom     
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    Table A3:  Summary Statistics by Industry 
     
Table A3:  Summary Statistics by Industry 
A: 1995 Levels Averaged by Industry 
 Energy   ln (Value  Total  Patent  Trade  Capital Share   
Industry Intensity    Added) Price Stock Openness Intensity Gas & Elect 
 (TJ/$M PPP) ($M PPP)  ($MPPP/TJ) (Number) (ratio) ($PPP/No employees ) (ratio) 
Food, beverages and tobacco 7.841 8.700 0.009 50.504 1.861 4.466 0.526 
Textiles and textile 7.419 7.693 0.013 100.147 4.244 3.864 0.558 
Leather, leather and footwear 4.321 5.960 0.017 6.238 6.613 3.706 0.534 
Wood and of wood and cork 10.682 6.896 0.010 70.549 1.813 3.923 0.402 
Pulp, paper, paper, printing and publishing 12.024 8.324 0.009 106.281 1.434 4.301 0.554 
Chemicals and chemical 41.294 8.374 0.003 465.055 3.367 4.926 0.326 
Rubber and plastics 5.171 7.485 0.019 146.971 2.500 4.306 0.716 
Other non-metallic mineral 27.410 7.701 0.005 154.932 1.106 4.572 0.410 
Basic metals and fabricated metal 26.570 8.576 0.005 239.731 2.236 4.265 0.367 
Machinery, nec 3.271 8.161 0.015 868.279 3.440 3.980 0.514 
Electrical and optical equipment 2.274 8.270 0.018 867.574 4.812 4.088 0.578 
Transport equipment 3.641 7.730 0.016 272.174 5.563 4.263 0.602 
 
B: Changes from 1995 to 2009 Averaged by Industry 
 (Energy   ln(Value  (Total  (Patent  (Trade  (Capital (Share   
Industry Intensity) Added) Price) Stock) Openness) Intensity) Gas & Elect) 
 (TJ/$M PPP) ($M PPP) ($MPPP/TJ) (Number) (ratio) ($PPP/No employees) (ratio) 
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.492 -0.028 0.004 13.285 0.948 0.001 0.120 
Textiles and textile -2.429 -0.410 0.010 3.054 4.499 0.042 0.112 
Leather, leather and footwear -1.063 -0.575 0.005 -0.313 22.448 0.629 0.075 
Wood and of wood and cork 1.399 0.085 -0.001 13.807 0.560 0.931 -0.068 
Pulp, paper, paper, printing and publishing 0.716 0.150 0.006 5.716 0.380 0.207 -0.012 
Chemicals and chemical -3.675 0.343 0.008 -75.587 3.402 0.312 0.084 
Rubber and plastics 0.714 0.220 0.009 46.485 0.903 0.179 0.033 
Other non-metallic mineral -4.027 -0.013 0.003 -5.298 0.394 0.248 0.071 
Basic metals and fabricated metal -9.714 0.118 0.004 41.186 0.510 0.163 0.127 
Machinery, nec -1.147 0.252 0.011 236.208 0.718 -0.033 0.041 
Electrical and optical equipment -0.330 0.600 0.029 354.390 3.063 0.058 0.019 
Transport equipment -1.028 0.312 0.009 201.912 9.062 0.305 0.052 
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Figure A1: Industrial energy intensity averaged by industry from 1995-2009 
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Robustness checks  
We check the robustness of our results by investigating whether the results do not change when we 
remove the 2009 sample from our dataset. This is informed by the need to make sure that our results 
are not driven by the sudden fall in oil price in 2009. We experimented by estimating our models 
using a sample period spanning 2005-2008.  
 
Table A4: Estimation results for EU manufacturing sector, 1995-2008 
 
 
     
Variables Random effect 
model 
Random effect 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
     
Total Price -0.602***  -0.594***  
 (0.0242)  (0.0239)  
Price-max  -0.652***  -0.737*** 
  (0.0296)  (0.0308) 
Price-cut  -0.451***  -0.425*** 
  (0.0411)  (0.0391) 
Price-rec  -0.647***  -0.581*** 
  (0.0318)  (0.0347) 
Patent -0.178*** -0.0301** -0.124*** -0.0139 
 (0.0281) (0.0134) (0.0303) (0.0145) 
Openness 0.0855*** 0.0860*** 0.236*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0262) (0.0268) (0.0271) 
Growth_VA -0.378*** -0.388*** -0.340*** -0.369*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0477) (0.0466) (0.0450) 
Capital_intensity 0.105*** 0.0997*** 0.0180 0.0177 
 (0.0311) (0.0330) (0.0341) (0.0333) 
Share-gas_electric -0.324*** -0.388*** -0.303*** -0.322*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0505) (0.0499) (0.0483) 
Patent*price -0.0291***  -0.0220***  
 (0.00516)  (0.00513)  
Patent*price-max  -0.0348***  -0.0239*** 
  (0.00584)  (0.00570) 
Patent*price-cut  0.00269  0.00243 
  (0.0106)  (0.0101) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.0247***  -0.0164** 
  (0.00672)  (0.00657) 
Constant -2.115*** 1.029** -4.140*** -0.601 
 (0.399) (0.415) (0.442) (0.431) 
     
Observations 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 
R-squared 0.648 0.621 0.629 0.655 
Year DVs YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 We found the estimated parameters for both symmetric and asymmetric price models to be very 
similar to those with full sample period used for the paper. We also estimated our model for both 
energy intensive and less-energy intensive industries, and the regions the 1995–2008 sample period. 
We obtained quite similar results to the earlier analysis. The results are reported from Table A4 to 
Table A7. Alternatively, we specify another model in which lag variables were included in the model 
but the results are not reported supported. 
 
Table A5: Estimation result for industry groups, 1995-2008 
 Energy intensive industries Less-Energy intensive industries 
Variables Fixed effects Fixed effects   Fixed effects Fixed effects 
     
Total Price -0.503***  -0.651*** industries 
 (0.0347)  (0.0321)  
Price-max  -0.681***  -0.855*** 
  (0.0582)  (0.0392) 
Price-cut  -0.424***  -0.451*** 
  (0.0648)  (0.0492) 
Price-rec  -0.0528  -0.656*** 
  (0.0895)  (0.0430) 
Patent -0.138** -0.0949*** -0.0921** 0.0219 
 (0.0549) (0.0220) (0.0374) (0.0195) 
Openness 0.297*** 0.341*** 0.201*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0391) (0.0352) (0.0358) 
Growth_VA -0.241*** -0.278*** -0.350*** -0.377*** 
 (0.0702) (0.0679) (0.0595) (0.0568) 
Capital_intensity 0.0151 0.0363 0.00897 -0.0118 
 (0.0507) (0.0492) (0.0444) (0.0435) 
Share-gas-electric -0.440*** -0.474*** -0.207*** -0.237*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0693) (0.0650) (0.0621) 
Patent*price -0.0138*  -0.0227***  
 (0.00825)  (0.00673)  
Patent*price-max  0.00584  -0.0189*** 
  (0.0132)  (0.00699) 
Patent*price-cut  0.00646  0.00372 
  (0.0179)  (0.0125) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.0887***  -0.0122 
  (0.0225)  (0.00816) 
Constant -3.661*** -1.487** -4.355*** -0.368 
 (0.673) (0.625) (0.573) (0.565) 
Observations 773 773 1,391 1,391 
R-squared 0.617 0.648 0.651 0.686 
Year DVs YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Estimation results for regional groups, 1995-2008 
 Western Europe Southern Europe Eastern Europe Northern Europe 
Variables   Fixed effects Fixed effects     Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Total Price -0.527***  -0.580***  -0.528***  -0.429***  
 (0.0383)  (0.0541)  (0.0472)  (0.0951)  
Price_Max  -0.539***  -0.712***  -0.389***  -0.822*** 
  (0.0495)  (0.0640)  (0.108)  (0.0936) 
Price_Cut  -0.729***  0.0130  -0.674***  -1.409*** 
  (0.0642)  (0.0642)  (0.128)  (0.207) 
Price_Rec  -0.646***  -0.557***  -0.336**  -0.514*** 
  (0.0541)  (0.0617)  (0.148)  (0.125) 
Patent -0.0394 0.0550* -0.221*** -0.0557* -0.469*** 0.0897** -0.448*** -0.185*** 
 (0.0466) (0.0303) (0.0843) (0.0285) (0.0933) (0.0355) (0.0873) (0.0538) 
Openness 0.306*** 0.245*** 0.301*** 0.351*** -0.0405 -0.0247 0.563*** 0.493*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0364) (0.0779) (0.0673) (0.0996) (0.103) (0.0699) (0.0641) 
Growth_VA -0.261*** -0.249*** -0.407*** -0.360*** -0.205 -0.121 -0.213** -0.291*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0630) (0.0995) (0.0834) (0.128) (0.128) (0.103) (0.0938) 
Capital_intensity -0.0438 0.0110 0.00326 0.0276 -0.0343 -0.0105 0.0909 0.0115 
 (0.0488) (0.0484) (0.0913) (0.0780) (0.0756) (0.0796) (0.0886) (0.0831) 
Share_gas_electric -0.113* -0.0908 -0.363*** -0.332*** -0.934*** -1.215*** -0.902*** -0.721*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0638) (0.120) (0.104) (0.214) (0.220) (0.135) (0.128) 
Patent*price -0.0172**  -0.0420**  -0.0988***  -0.0515***  
 (0.00761)  (0.0167)  (0.0196)  (0.0172)  
Patent*price-max  -0.0233***  -0.0780***  -0.141***  -0.00553 
  (0.00850)  (0.0159)  (0.0339)  (0.0163) 
Patent*price-cut  0.0622***  -0.169***  0.0660  0.259*** 
  (0.0146)  (0.0217)  (0.0558)  (0.0440) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.00446  -0.0810***  -0.154***  0.0237 
  (0.0104)  (0.0165)  (0.0376)  (0.0234) 
Carbon_Tax - - - - - - -0.130*** -0.144*** 
       (0.0342) (0.0300) 
Constant -5.142*** -1.857*** -4.755*** -2.684*** 1.199 3.227** -7.473*** -3.946*** 
 (0.603) (0.588) (1.114) (0.983) (1.548) (1.512) (1.261) (1.058) 
Observations 1,086 1,086 482 482 200 200 396 396 
R-squared 0.600 0.622 0.567 0.706 0.775 0.784 0.860 0.888 
Year DVs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Estimations results for ETS-covered industries, 1995-2008 
 ETS-covered Sectors     Non ETS- covered Sector 
         
VARIABLES Paper  Non-Metallic  Basic Metal  Chemicals 
 
Total Price -0.388***  -0.358***  -0.480***  -0.662***  
 (0.0425)  (0.0966)  (0.0847)  (0.0822)  
Price_Max  -0.723***  -0.311**  -1.025***  -0.859*** 
  (0.105)  (0.151)  (0.155)  (0.100) 
Price_Cut  -0.180**  -0.501***  -0.233  -1.339*** 
  (0.0711)  (0.148)  (0.197)  (0.196) 
Price_Rec  -0.0176  -0.182  0.557**  -0.366* 
  (0.117)  (0.168)  (0.241)  (0.220) 
Patent 0.0919 -0.0353 0.0486 0.0446 0.108 -0.0421 -0.0828 0.158** 
 (0.0775) (0.0347) (0.133) (0.0541) (0.120) (0.0419) (0.152) (0.0719) 
Openness 0.305*** 0.310*** 0.588*** 0.550*** -0.0410 0.00461 0.848*** 0.807*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0669) (0.0742) (0.0961) (0.0881) (0.0873) (0.0928) (0.0895) 
Growth_VA -0.239* -0.230* -0.279** -0.294** -0.319** -0.379*** -0.146 -0.214* 
 (0.124) (0.125) (0.115) (0.118) (0.146) (0.140) (0.134) (0.127) 
Capital_intensity 0.00336 0.0238 -0.417*** -0.411*** 0.0519 0.134 -0.249* -0.273** 
 (0.0893) (0.0961) (0.0939) (0.101) (0.0908) (0.0901) (0.132) (0.125) 
Share-gas-electric -0.299*** -0.385*** -0.494*** -0.484*** -0.416** -0.421**   
 (0.110) (0.119) (0.151) (0.150) (0.166) (0.179)   
Patent*price 0.0300**  -0.000526  0.0334*  -0.0258  
 (0.0136)  (0.0205)  (0.0184)  (0.0179)  
Patent*price-max  0.130***  -0.00289  0.129***  0.0413* 
  (0.0353)  (0.0301)  (0.0325)  (0.0238) 
Patent*price-cut  -0.0422*  0.0340  -0.0196  0.101* 
  (0.0241)  (0.0384)  (0.0413)  (0.0516) 
Patent*price-rec  -0.0777**  -0.00232  -0.188***  -0.0363 
  (0.0311)  (0.0398)  (0.0573)  (0.0522) 
Constant -3.779*** -2.107* -5.217*** -2.843** 1.268 2.681* -12.27*** -8.393*** 
 (0.990) (1.114) (1.300) (1.327) (1.524) (1.365) (1.680) (1.416) 
Observations 203 203 180 180 203 203 187 187 
R-squared 0.559 0.595 0.662 0.679 0.676 0.711 0.848 0.871 
Year DVs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
51 
 
Figure A2: Time Series of Energy Intensity and Energy Price by Industry 
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Figure A3: Time Series of Energy Intensity and Patent by Industry 
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Appendix A10: Evolution of Gross Value Added of Energy Intensive Industries for selected 
countries 
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